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Abstract: This article examines the relation between personal income and hierarchical 
power. In the context of a firm hierarchy, I define hierarchical power as the number of 
subordinates under an individual’s control. Using the available case-study evidence, I find 
that relative income within firms scales strongly with hierarchical power. I also find that 
hierarchical power affects income more strongly than any other factor for which data is 
available. I conclude that this is preliminary evidence for a hierarchical-power theory of 
personal income distribution.
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What explains personal income? This article tests the hypothesis that income is most 
strongly explained by hierarchical power. My approach represents a twist on the longstanding 
institutionalist view that income stems from power. The primary theoretical contribution 
of this article is to restrict the study of power to that found in a hierarchy, and to offer a 
specific way of measuring this power. I define hierarchical power as the ability to influence 
subordinates within a hierarchical chain of command. I propose that this power can be 
measured in terms of the number of subordinates under an individual’s control 
Using this definition, I conduct the first investigation of how hierarchical power 
(within firms) affects individual income. To be clear, this type of investigation is in its 
infancy and relies on a relatively small sample of data. However, the evidence that does 
exist is unambiguous. I find that relative income within case-study firms scales strongly 
with hierarchical power. Furthermore, I find that grouping individuals by hierarchical rank 
(across society) affects income more strongly than any other factor tested here. I argue that 
this is preliminary evidence for a hierarchical power theory of personal income distribution. 
The article is organized as follows.  I first outline the motivations behind my proposed 
hierarchical power-income hypothesis. I then look for a correlation between hierarchical 
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power and relative income within case-study firms. Lastly, I investigate the strength of the 
hierarchical power-income effect (at the societal level) using a variation of the analysis of 
variance method. All methods and sources are documented in the Appendix.1 I conclude 
with thoughts on the significance of the hierarchical power-income relation, and I discuss 
avenues for future research. 
Hierarchical Power and Income
I hypothesize that personal income can be explained most strongly by differentials in 
hierarchical power. Before diving into the specifics of this hypothesis, I want to provide a 
rationale based on the big picture of human history. I begin by asking a simple question: 
what aspects of human history suggest that hierarchical power might affect how humans 
distribute resources? 
Let’s begin with our deep history—the evolutionary backdrop of the human species. 
Humans are but one of a wide variety of social mammals, virtually all of which form 
dominance hierarchies, or “pecking orders” (Barroso, Alados, and Boza 2000; Guhl, Collias, 
and Allee 1945; Kondo and Hurnik 1990; Meese and Ewbank 1973; Sapolsky 2005; 
Uhrich 1938). A key characteristic of these dominance hierarchies is that high social rank is 
associated with preferential access to resources, particularly sexual mates (Bradley et al. 2005; 
Haley, Deutsch, and Le Boeuf 1994; Girman et al. 1997; Gerloff et al. 1999; Wroblewski et 
al. 2009). 
Of course, human behavior is far more complex than even the most intelligent non-
human primates. Just because we evolved from hierarchy-forming animals does not necessarily 
mean that hierarchical rank still plays a role in how we divide up the pie. However, there is 
good evidence that humans do have an instinctual behavior towards hierarchy formation. 
Several studies have shown that children and adolescents spontaneously form dominance 
hierarchies when placed into small groups (Frankel and Arbel 1980; Savin-Williams 1980; 
Strayer and Trudel 1984). Other studies have shown that, like other social mammals, human 
reproductive success increases with social status (Hopcroft 2006; Betzig 2012). There is even 
evidence that social status at birth is epigenetically imprinted on human DNA (Borghol 
et al. 2012)—something that also occurs in Rhesus monkeys (Massart et al. 2017). Given 
our evolutionary heritage, it seems plausible that hierarchy plays a role in the way humans 
distribute resources. 
Another reason to suspect that resource distribution has to do with hierarchy and 
power is the ubiquity of inherited status in human history. It is hard to justify the wealth of 
a hereditary aristocracy as stemming from anything but power and privilege. Interestingly, 
inherited status has surprisingly deep historical roots. There is tentative archaeological 
evidence for inherited status beginning in the Neolithic era (Boric 1996; Halstead 1993; 
Van der Velde 1990), and widespread evidence beginning in the bronze age around 5000 
years ago (Aranda and Molina 2006; Aranda-Jimenez, Monton-Subias and Jimenez-Brobeil 
2009; Graziadio 1991; Kristiansen 2000; Harding 2000). It is around this time that the 
first Egyptian dynasty formed (Dee et al. 2013), followed later by dynasties in Mesopotamia 
(Reade 2001) and China (Guo et al. 2000). 
1 All appendices mentioned throughout this article are available as supplemental data online as found on 
the title page of the article.
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Since then, as Gaetano Mosca observes, the existence of a hereditary ruling class has 
been the norm: 
There is practically no country of longstanding civilization that has not 
had a hereditary aristocracy at one period or another in its history. We 
find hereditary nobilities during certain periods in China and ancient 
Egypt, in India, in Greece before the wars with the Medes, in ancient 
Rome, among the Slays, among the Latins and Germans of the Middle 
Ages, in Mexico at the time of the Discovery and in Japan down to a few 
years ago. (Mosca 1939) 
But while history may be sordid, there is always the possibility that modern societies have 
made a clean break with the past. Power may have played a central role in the distribution of 
resources in past societies, but in modern societies reciprocal exchange is what matters most. 
This is the story that emerged in the writings of Adam Smith (1776) and was codified into 
neoclassical theory by William Stanley Jevons (1879), Carl Menger (1871), and Leon Walras 
(1896). To paraphrase George Orwell (1972), this is now the prevailing orthodoxy that most 
right-thinking economists accept without question. 
But what if there has not been a clean break with the past? What if power still plays 
an important role in shaping resource distribution? A wide variety of scholars have argued 
that this is the case. A non-exhaustive list would include Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means 
(1932), Clair Brown (1988), John Commons (1924), William Dugger (1989), John Galbraith 
(1985), Evelyne Huber, Jingjing Huo and John Stephens (2017), Gerhard Lenski (1966), 
C. Wright Mills (1956), John Munkirs (1985), Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler 
(2009), James Peach (1987), Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto (2001), Marc Tool and Warren 
Samuels (1989), Marc Tool (2017), Thorstein Veblen (1904, 1923), Max Weber (1978), and 
Erik Wright (1979). These scholars argue that power plays a central role in shaping income 
distribution. 
If there is to be a power-based theory of income distribution, what should it look like? 
According to Christopher Brown: 
 [A] theory of distribution should be indistinguishable from a theory of 
power. A satisfactory theory of power would, beyond defining what power 
is, elucidate principles to explain how power is established, enlarged or 
diminished, protected and perpetuated, redistributed, exercised, and 
rendered legitimate or illegitimate. (Brown 2005) 
A full-fledged theory of power is a tall order. In this article, I narrow the focus to look 
only at hierarchical power and its relation to personal income. My ideas stem from the work 
of Herbert Simon (1957) and Harold Lydall (1959), who independently proposed income 
distribution models based on the hierarchical structure of firms. 
The focus of Simon and Lydall’s work is the branching nature of firm hierarchies, in 
which each superior controls multiple subordinates. This structure is unique to humans. 
All other animals form linear hierarchies—an ordinal ranking from top to bottom. The most 
important feature of a branching hierarchy is that it concentrates power in the hands of the 
few. I propose that differentials in hierarchical power can be used to explain differentials in 
income. The main theoretical contribution of this article is to offer a quantifiable definition 
931Personal Income and Hierarchical Power
of hierarchical power that allows power differentials to be directly compared to income 
differentials. 
Measuring Hierarchical Power
What is hierarchical power? I define it as the ability to control subordinates within a 
hierarchical chain of command. This definition builds on the common Weberian definition 
of power, articulated by Reinhard Bendix (1998) as “the possibility of imposing one’s will 
upon the behavior of other persons” (cited in Wallimann, Ch Tatsis, and Zito. 1977). Or put 
another way, Raymond Aron (1964) defines the Weberian concept of power as “the chance 
of obtaining the obedience of others to a particular command” (cited in Wallimann, Ch 
Tatsis and Zito 1977). 
The link between hierarchy and power is implicit in the etymology of the word 
“hierarchy” itself, which derives from the Greek term hierarkhes, meaning “sacred ruler” 
(Verdier 2006). In essence, a hierarchy is a nested set of power relations between a superior (a 
ruler) and subordinates (the ruled). The hierarchical chain of command confers the right of 
each superior to direct the activity of all those in subordinate positions. I propose that one’s 
power within a hierarchy is proportional to the number of subordinates under one’s control. 
I put this in formula form as: 
hierarchical power number of subordinates 1= +   (1)
The logic of this equation is that all individuals start at a baseline power of 1, indicating 
that they have control over themselves. Power then increases linearly with the number of 
subordinates. 
If we had access to the exact chain of command structure of an institution, we could use 
this definition to measure the power of each individual within a hierarchy. Unfortunately, 
chain of command information is rarely available. Instead, existing case studies report 
aggregate hierarchical structure only—total employment by hierarchical level. While we cannot 
calculate the power of specific individuals, we can use this data to calculate the average power 
of all individuals in a specific hierarchical level: 
 P S 1h h= +r r  (2)
Figure 1. Calculating the Average Number of Subordinates
Here Phr  is the average power of individuals in hierarchical level h, and Shr  is the average 
number of subordinates below these individuals. The average number of subordinates Shr
is equal to the sum of employment (E) in all subordinate levels, divided by employment 
in the level in question. Figure 1 shows a sample calculation of the average number of 
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subordinates below individuals in the third hierarchical level. Each shaded individual has 2 
direct subordinates, and 4 indirect subordinates, for a total of 6 subordinates. The average 
hierarchical power of individuals in level 3 is therefore 7. 
Using summation notation, we can write the following general equation for the average 
number of subordinates in hierarchical level h (here h = 1 is the bottom hierarchical level): 
 S E
E
h
i
h
h
i
1
1
=
=
-
r |  (3)
Together, equations 2 and 3 allow us to define and measure the average power of 
individuals in a hierarchy. 
Two Hypotheses
I propose that hierarchical power is a strong determinant of income. To refine this hypothesis, 
I break it down into two parts: 
Hypothesis A: Relative income within a hierarchy is proportional to hierarchical 
power. 
Hypothesis B: Hierarchical power affects income more strongly than any other 
factor for which data is available. 
The reasoning behind this two-part hypothesis has mostly to do with the format of 
the available data. In principle, we could look at the proportionality between income and 
hierarchical power and test the strength of this effect all in one go. We would simply measure 
the correlation between individual income and hierarchical power and compare the strength 
of this correlation to the correlation between other income-affecting factors. Unfortunately, 
few studies of firm hierarchy report individual level data. Those that do report this data do 
not report a wide range of other income-affecting factors against which to test the strength 
of the power-income effect. 
The two-part hypothesis offers a way to deal with these data constraints by separating 
the measure of correlation between income and hierarchical power, and the measure of the 
strength of this effect. In the proceeding section, I use the available firm case-study evidence 
to investigate the correlation between relative income and hierarchical power. I then use a 
variant of the analysis of variance method to estimate the strength of the relation between 
hierarchical power and income. 
Correlation Between Hierarchical Power and Relative Income Within Firms
Hypothesis A proposes that relative income within a hierarchy is proportional to hierarchical 
power. To test this hypothesis, I use the available firm case-study evidence to look for a 
correlation between hierarchical power and relative income within firms. I first look for 
a static correlation, followed by an analysis of the dynamic correlation between changes in 
income and changes in hierarchical power. 
Static Power-Income Correlation
To look for a static correlation between income and hierarchical power, I use six 
case studies that cover firms in the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, 
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and Portugal. (For a detailed discussion of these studies, see Appendix B). There are 
two important caveats to this analysis. First, the sample size is small. Having scoured the 
academic literature, these six studies are the only ones that I have found with the appropriate 
data. This paucity of data is partly due to the proprietary nature of firm payrolls. But more 
importantly, mainstream (neoclassical) economics has tended to ignore power, so there has 
been little academic incentive to study firm hierarchy. A second caveat to my analysis is that 
the case-study firms are all relatively large. This is not a methodological choice; instead, all of 
the available case studies have focused on large firms. The public sector is also excluded from 
analysis and left as a topic for future research. 
Figure 2 shows the correlation between relative income and hierarchical power within 
the six case-study firms. Each point represents a single firm-year observation, with the 
different case-study firms indicated by shape. Note that this figure plots average income (by 
hierarchical level) against average hierarchical power (by hierarchical level). In order to make 
comparisons across firms (and across time), I normalize incomes so that the mean income 
Figure 2. Average Income vs. Average Hierarchical Power in Case-Study Firms
This figure plots average income against average hierarchical power for six case-study firms (Audas, Barmby, and Treble 2004; 
Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1993; Dohmen, Kriechel, and Pfann 2004; Lima 2000; Morais and Kakabadse 2014; Treble 
et al. 2001). Average income is normalized to equal one in the base hierarchical level. Average hierarchical power is calculated 
using Equations 2 and 3. Each point represents a single firm-year observation, and shape indicates the particular case study. 
The line indicates a log-log regression, while the grey region indicates the 95% confidence interval. 
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in the bottom hierarchical level of each firm is equal to one. Although the firm sample is 
small, the evidence is unambiguous: there is a strong correlation between relative income 
and hierarchical power in these case-study firms. 
Dynamic Correlation
I test for a dynamic correlation between changes in relative income and changes in 
hierarchical power using data published by George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt 
Holmstrom (1993)—the “BGH dataset.” This dataset contains raw personnel data for a large 
U.S. firm over the years 1969–1985. Importantly, the BGH dataset tracks the income and 
hierarchical level of individuals over time. This allows the analysis of changes in income 
and hierarchical power when individuals are promoted or demoted. I define a promotion/
demotion as a change in hierarchical level. 
Since the chain of command is unknown, I begin by assigning all individuals the average 
hierarchical power ( Pr ) of their respective hierarchical level. For each promotion/demotion 
Figure 3. Changes in Hierarchical Power and Pay During Intra-Firm Promotions
This figure plots the fractional change in pay (Equation 5) versus the fractional change in hierarchical power (Equation 4) for 
individual promotions/demotions in the Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (BGH) dataset (Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1993). 
Each point represents the resulting change in pay and power of a single individual. Over 16,000 promotion/demotion events 
are plotted here. The grey region indicates the 95% prediction interval of a log-log regression. The BGH data comes from an 
anonymous United States firm over the period 1969–1985. The dataset is available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/
michael.gibbs/research/index.html 
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event, I then calculate the fractional change in an individual’s hierarchical power ( PT r ) as 
the following ratio: 
 P
P
P
before
after
T =r r
r
 (4)
Here Pafterr  is hierarchical power after the promotion and Pbeforer  is hierarchical power 
before the promotion. For each promotion/demotion event, I also calculate the fractional 
change in income (∆I): 
 I
I
I
I
I
before
before
after
after
T =
r
r
 (5)
Here I
after 
is individual income after the promotion, and I
before
 is individual income 
before the promotion. In order to isolate the effect of the promotion from the effects of 
inflation and/or general wage increases, I measure after-before incomes relative to the firm 
mean income in the appropriate year. Here Iafterr  is firm mean income after the individual’s 
promotion, while Ibeforer  is firm mean income before the individual’s promotion. 
Figure 3 show the results of this dynamic analysis. Each point represents the fractional 
change in pay and hierarchical power for the promotion/demotion of a single individual. Over 
16,000 promotions/demotion events are shown. Within the BGH data, a highly significant 
correlation exists between changes in hierarchical power and changes in individual income. 
Interestingly, the correlation holds both for promotions and for demotions, the latter occurring 
when an individual drops hierarchical levels. The relative pay reductions accompanying these 
demotions are difficult to understand from neoclassical marginal productivity perspective. 
Do these individuals suddenly experience a drastic reduction in ability/productivity? The 
evidence in Figure 3 suggests a better explanation: within the BGH firm, pay is largely a 
function of the power of a specific hierarchical position, irrespective of the person holding 
this position. 
To summarize, the case-study evidence indicates that relative income within firms is 
both statically and dynamically correlated with hierarchical power. This evidence is consistent 
with the hypothesis that relative income within a hierarchy is proportional to hierarchical 
power. 
How Strongly Does Hierarchical Power Affect Income?
Having found a correlation between hierarchical power and income, the next step of the 
analysis is to measure the strength of this effect at the societal level. Hypothesis B proposes 
that hierarchical power affects income more strongly than any other factor for which data 
is available. To test Hypothesis B, we need to relate hierarchical power’s effect on income to 
the effect-size of a variety of other factors. To do this, I use a signal-to-noise ratio similar to 
Cohen’s f2. As with the test of Hypothesis A, a caveat to this test of Hypothesis B is that the 
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Figure 4. Visualizing Effect Size
This figure shows an example of how a two-group factor like a person’s sex might affect income. Each panel shows a hypothet-
ical income distribution of both males and females. We can judge the income effect size of being male vs. female by comparing 
the “signal” to the “noise.” The signal is the income difference between group mean incomes (dotted lines), while the noise is 
the income dispersion within groups (visualized here as the standard deviation). The larger the signal is relative to the noise, the 
larger the effect on income. Individual’s sex has a small effect on income in Panel A and a large effect in Panel B. 
Signal
Noise
Male
Female
Signal
Noise
Noise
Male
Female
Income Income
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ns
ity
De
ns
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A.  Small Effect on Income B.  Large Effect on Income
available evidence on firm hierarchy is limited. Therefore, this analysis should be considered 
preliminary. 
Measuring Effect Size with A Signal-to-Noise Ratio
I measure income effect size using a group-based signal-to-noise ratio. This method has 
two parts. First, we organize individuals into an income-affecting grouping (for instance, by 
individuals’ sex). To measure the effect that this grouping has on income, we then calculate 
the signal-to-noise ratio by comparing dispersion in average income between groups to the 
average income dispersion within groups (Equation 6). The larger the signal-to-noise ratio, 
the larger the grouping’s effect on income. 
 signal to noise ratio average within group income dispersion
between group income dispersion
- - = -
-
 (6)
Figure 4 shows an example of how a two-group factor like individuals’ sex might affect 
income. Dispersion between groups is evident as the difference between mean incomes of each 
sex (dotted lines). Within-group dispersion is visible in terms of the average spread (width) of 
each sex’s respective income distribution. Figure 4A shows a small effect on income—evident 
as a small difference between group means and large within-group dispersion. Conversely, 
Figure 4B shows a large effect on income—evident as a large difference between group means 
and small within-group dispersion. While the signal-to-noise ratio is most easily illustrated 
for a two-group factor, it can be generalized to an income-affecting factor with any number 
of groups.
Although there are many ways of measuring income effect size, an advantage of this 
group-based approach is that it is easily applicable to the qualitative variables that are well-
known to effect income (such as “sex,” “race,” “occupation,” “education,” etc.). To compare 
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the income effect of two factors such as “sex” and “race,” we compare the signal-to-noise ratio 
of grouping individuals by their sex to the signal-to-noise ratio of grouping individuals by 
their race. Another advantage of this group-based approach is that we do not need to have a 
single sample of individuals with an exhaustive list of their characteristics and income (like 
we would need for a multivariate regression analysis). Instead, we can use different datasets 
for each respective income-affecting factor, provided that each dataset is representative of the 
general population.2
In standard analysis of variance, the signal-to-noise ratio is called Cohen’s f2, and is 
calculated using variance as the measure of dispersion (Fleishman 1980; Steiger 2004). 
However, I do not use Cohen’s f2 to measure income effect size because variance is not 
commonly reported in income distribution statistics. Instead, statistical agencies typically 
report the Gini index of income dispersion within groups. Because of its ubiquity, I use the 
Gini index to calculate the signal-to-noise ratio:3 
 ( )signal to noise ratio Gini average within group Gini index
Gini index of group means
- - = -  (7)
For a detailed discussion of this metric (and its relation to Cohen’s f2), see Appendix H. 
Grouping Individuals by Hierarchical Level
In order to measure the income effect of hierarchical power using the signal-to-noise 
ratio, we must group individuals into different classes of hierarchical power. My method is to 
group individuals by hierarchical level across all firms, as illustrated in Figure 5. This method is 
theoretically attractive because hierarchical level is the principle determinant of hierarchical 
power. If a firm has a constant “span of control” (the number of subordinates controlled 
by each superior) then hierarchical power will increase exponentially with hierarchical level). 
This grouping method is also empirically convenient because the available data on firm 
hierarchies is limited, and the most commonly reported statistic is the distribution of income 
by hierarchical level. 
2 Readers trained in econometrics will observe that my method for measuring effect-size does not isolate 
the income-effects of a given factor. It does not show that, when all other factors are held constant, a change in 
factor A by amount x affects income by amount y. I make no attempt to do this because I think it is the wrong 
approach. As John Maynard Keynes (1939) long ago argued, the only conceivable way that an econometric model 
can isolate an effect is if the model includes a complete list of causal factors. But since we can never be sure that our 
causal list is complete, we can never know if our econometric model is wrong (Nitzan 1992). My thinking is more 
pragmatic. Given the complexities of human behavior, we can likely never isolate a factor to find its “true” effect on 
income. But we can rank effect-size with the full understanding that when we measure one factor’s effect on income, 
enumerable other factors are included in this measurement. In the face of enumerable confounding variables, 
Occam’s razor would suggest that we simply chose the factor with the largest effect on income and use it to build a 
theory of income distribution. 
3 A well-known shortcoming of the Gini index is that it has a downward bias for small sample sizes. If the 
sample size is n, the maximum possible Gini index is: 
Gmaxn nn 1= -  (8)
Thus, a sample size of n = 2 has a maximum Gini index of Gmax2 = 0.5. To correct for this bias, I use the method 
proposed by George Deltas (2003). The bias-adjusted Gini index (Gadj) is defined by dividing the unadjusted Gini 
(G) by the maximum possible Gini (Gmaxn ): 
 Gadj G
G
max
n
=  (9)
I use the adjusted Gini index for all between-group Gini calculations in this article.
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Methods
Hypothesis B proposes that hierarchical power affects income more strongly than any 
other factor for which data is available. To test this hypothesis, I use the signal-to-noise ratio 
(Equation 7) to quantify the income effect of each factor shown in Table 1. All data (except 
those discussed below) come from the United States. If Hypothesis B is correct, grouping 
individuals by hierarchical level (across society) should produce the largest signal-to-noise 
ratio. 
My method is as follows. For each income-affecting factor, I divide a sample of the 
U.S. population into the appropriate groups. For example, the factor “sex” groups the 
U.S. population into males and females. Similarly, the factor “occupation” groups the U.S. 
population into fifty-five different occupations, the factor “education” groups the U.S. 
population into nine levels of education, and the factor “hierarchical level” groups the U.S. 
population into 12–14 hierarchical levels. (For more details about sources and methods, see 
Appendix A). Once we have the grouping for a specific factor, we calculate income dispersion 
between groups and compare it to average income dispersion within groups (using the Gini 
index). The ratio of these two quantities—the signal-to noise ratio—indicates the income 
effect size of the factor in question. We can then use these signal-to-noise ratios to rank the 
income effect sizes of the factors in Table 1. 
The point of this analysis is to determine if grouping individuals by hierarchical level 
has the greatest effect on income. The problem, as I have stated previously, is that the data 
on firm hierarchy is quite limited. I am not aware of any dataset on hierarchical rank and 
income for a large sample of U.S. citizens. Because of this data shortage, I am forced to use 
model-dependent data. I build a model that extrapolates the available case-study data on 
firm hierarchy to estimate the hierarchical pay structure of 713 U.S. firms in the Compustat 
database (covering the years 1992–2015). This “Compustat Model” is discussed in detail in 
the Appendix. The model generates synthetic data from which we can estimate the signal-to-
noise ratio of grouping individuals by hierarchical level. I also use the Compustat model to 
estimate the signal-to-noise ratio of grouping individuals by firm. 
I supplement this model-dependent data with two non-U.S. studies that are purely 
empirical. The first source is a seminal study by Holger Mueller, Paige Ouimet, and Elena 
Simintzi (2016) that reports income distribution by hierarchical level for 880 United 
Kingdom firms over the period 2004–2013. The second source is a study by Fredrik Heyman 
(2005) that analyzes the pay distribution of the top four levels of management in 560 Swedish 
Figure 5. Grouping Individuals by Hierarchical Level
This figure shows how I group individuals by hierarchical power. My groups consist of all individuals (regardless of firm) that 
share the same hierarchical level. In this figure, each hierarchy represents a different firm. Groups are indicated by shaded 
regions. 
1
2
4
3
5
level
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firms in the year 1995. Heyman’s data comes with the caveat that it does not represent 
all hierarchical levels—just the top four. (For this reason, I mark Heyman’s results with an 
asterisk). I use this non-U.S. data as an empirical check on the Compustat model’s results. 
Table 1. Income-Affecting Factors Used to Test Hypothesis B (cont.)
Geographic Physical Attribute Socioeconomic
Census Block Group Age Education
Census Tract Cognitive Score* Employee vs. Self-Employed
County Race Firm*
Urban vs. Rural Sex Full vs. Part Time
Hierarchical Level*
Home Owner vs. Renter
Occupation
Parents’ Income Percentile
Public vs. Private Sector
Religion
Type of Income (Labor/
Property)
* Indicates variables that use model-dependent data (at least in part). For sources and methods, see Appendix A
Results
The results of my test of hypothesis B are shown in Figure 6, which plots signal-to-noise 
ratios for each of the nineteen different income-affecting factors. To reiterate, the signal-to-
noise ratio is the ratio of between-group dispersion to average within-group dispersion. A 
larger signal-to-noise ratio indicates that grouping individuals by the factor in question has 
a larger effect on income. For all factors except religion and cognitive score, the boxplots 
indicate the variation of the signal-to-noise ratio over time (typically the last twenty years). 
For religion, the boxplot range indicates uncertainty in the signal-to-noise ratio. For cognitive 
scores, the boxplot range represents variation between different studies. 
This test of hypothesis B yields unambiguous results. Of the nineteen different income-
affecting factors tested; the evidence suggests that grouping individuals by hierarchical level 
has the strongest effect on income. Importantly, the Compustat model produces a signal-to-
noise ratio that is consistent with the purely empirical (non-U.S.) studies of firm hierarchy. 
This supports the model’s results. 
In addition to the support for hypothesis B, Figure 6 reveals a few other notable findings. 
Firstly, physical attributes (age, cognitive score, race, and sex) have a relatively insignificant 
effect on income. Geographic effects are also quite small, although they become larger as 
the geographic area decreases. (Geographic factors ranked from largest to smallest area are: 
county, tract, block group). 
Of symbolic interest is the one-to-one value for the signal-to-noise ratio—the point 
where the signal is of equal size to the noise. Besides hierarchical level, only two other factors 
have an income effect size that is significantly larger than this one-to-one threshold: labor 
vs. property income and full vs. part time. The latter is easily understandable. Part-time 
individuals work significantly fewer hours than full-time individuals, so we would expect 
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significant income differentials between the two groups. Added to this effect is the fact that 
part-time jobs are often in sectors (such as retail) that have lower wages than in sectors where 
full-time employment is the norm (like mining). 
But what should we make of the significant effect of functional income type (property 
vs. labor)? At first glance, this may seem to support many political economists’ deeply held 
convictions about functional income distribution: capitalists tend to be much wealthier 
than workers. While this may be true, the results shown here indicate something different. 
They indicate that property income is on average much less than labor income. This result is 
best thought of as an artifact of the U.S. Census accounting method. In the Census data, 
Figure 6. The Signal-to-Noise Ratio for Different Income-Affecting Factors
* Includes only top 4 hierarchical levels.
This figure shows signal-to-noise ratios for each of the 19 income-affecting factors used to test Hypothesis B (which proposes that 
hierarchical power affects income more strongly than any other factor for which data is available). The signal-to-noise ratio indi-
cates the income effect of grouping individuals according to the factor in question. The boxplots indicate the total range (horizontal 
line), twenty-fifth to seventy-fifth percentile range (the box), and the median (vertical line) of the signal-to-noise ratio. With the 
exception of hierarchical level data from Mueller, Ouimet, and Simintzi (2016) and Heyman (2005), all data is from the United 
States. For sources and methods, see Appendix A. 
Greater effect on income
Between−Group Dispersion = Within−Group Dispersion
Public vs. Private Sector
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Race
Employee vs. 
Self−Employed
Urban vs. Rural
Home Owner vs. Renter
Religion
Parent Income Percentile
Sex
Age
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Census Block Group
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Education
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(Compustat Model)
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(Heyman)
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(Mueller et al.)
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Signal−to−Noise Ratio (using Gini Index)
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“property income” includes anyone with some form of dividend, interest, or rental income. 
This means that average property income is trivially small—about 8% of the average income 
from wages/salaries. This is because many people earn small amounts of property income in 
the form of interest on savings or dividends from small investments. Since these people likely 
earn income from other sources, this comparison of Census data for labor and property 
income has little meaning. However, I include it here for the sake of completeness.4
To summarize, the available evidence (which is preliminary) suggests that grouping 
individuals by hierarchical level affects income more strongly than any of the other eighteen 
factors tested here. 
Discussion
The evidence presented here raises many questions for future research. For instance, how 
general is the correlation between hierarchical power and relative income within firms? Does 
this correlation generalize to the public sector? Does it vary between countries? And related 
to this—does the income-effect of grouping individuals by hierarchical level vary by country 
(or over time)? When better data on firm/government hierarchy becomes available, we can 
begin to answer these questions. 
Another important question to ask is – what are the mechanisms that cause income 
to be correlated with hierarchical power? My hunch is that there are no simple answers to 
this question, because there are many “pathways to power” (Price and Feinman 2010). A 
hierarchical chain of command can be sustained in many different ways, ranging from the 
pure use of ideology to the pure use of force. In the purely ideological case, the hierarchy 
functions because subordinates simply agree that their superior has legitimate authority. In 
this case, subordinates likely believe that their superior deserves to earn more than them. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the history of slavery indicates that a hierarchy can also 
function through brutal repression. In this case, the income of superiors is an outcome of 
the judicious use of force. In both cases, the superior has power over subordinates, but the 
appearance (and justification) of this power is very different. An intriguing possibility is that 
greater inequality within a hierarchy might be associated with a greater use of intimidation 
and fear (rather than the use of a legitimizing ideology). 
It is also plausible that belief in the legitimacy of a hierarchy increases with hierarchical 
rank (Schmidt 2001). If this is true, it should manifest in opinions about income. Interestingly, 
a recent survey reveals that a majority of Americans question the legitimacy of CEO income 
(Larcker et al. 2016). Only 16% of the general public agree that CEOs are “paid the correct 
amount relative to the average worker.” Yet a majority of Fortune 500 CEOs (64%) thought 
that CEO pay was “correct.” It would be fascinating to expand this type of survey to see if 
there is a gradient of opinion by hierarchical rank. 
Another complexity is that firms are not islands unto themselves—there are power 
relations between institutions as well as within them (Bichler and Nitzan 2017). Government 
regulation, for instance, can have a significant impact on CEO pay. CEOs in the highly 
4 To compare the income-effect of functional income type, what we really need to do is group individuals 
by the proportion of income coming from property sources. Based on the work of Thomas Piketty (2014), it is 
reasonable to expect that this would strongly affect income. Piketty shows how the proportion of capitalist income 
increases with income fractile in the United States. But this grouping is the reverse of what would be required to 
apply my analysis of variance method. Piketty groups individuals by income size, while the method used here would 
require grouping individuals by the proportion of capitalist income. At present, I am not aware of the data sources 
that would allow such a grouping.
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regulated U.S. utility sector have significantly lower pay than CEOs in other sectors (see 
Appendix F, as well as Joskow et al. (1993). There is also evidence that CEO pay has a class-
like cohesiveness. The average compensation of top U.S. CEOs moves coherently with the 
capitalization of large firms (Mishel and Davis 2014). This raises interesting implications 
for integrating the concept of hierarchical power with Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon 
Bichler’s (2009) “capital as power” hypothesis, in which capital is conceived as a symbolic 
representation of power. 
Lastly, the evidence presented here raises questions about recent increases in income 
inequality that have occurred in the United States and other countries (see Piketty and 
Saez 2001, 2006; Piketty 2014; Atkinson and Piketty 2010; Alvaredo et al. 2013). To what 
extent has this increase been due to an increase in hierarchical pay inequality? Because the 
empirical study of the relation between income and hierarchical power is in its infancy, the 
avenues for future research are expansive. 
Conclusions
The hypothesis that income is related to power has been proposed numerous times over the 
last century. However, in its general form a power-income hypothesis is difficult to test. Power 
is simply too broad a concept to pin down empirically. In this article, I have attempted to 
overcome this difficulty by narrowing the focus to hierarchical power only, which I define as 
the number of subordinates under an individual’s control. 
Although the data on firm hierarchy is limited (and thus results should be considered 
preliminary), the available evidence is clear. There is a strong correlation between relative 
income and hierarchical power within case-study firms. Moreover, the available U.S. 
evidence suggests that grouping individuals (across society) by hierarchical level affects 
income more strongly than any other factor tested. I suggest that this is preliminary evidence 
for a hierarchical power theory of personal income distribution. 
I conclude by offering some thoughts on the ideological implications of such a theory. 
Regardless of their scientific merit, all theories of income distribution evoke some form 
of ethics that either justifies income redistribution or justifies the status quo. Conventional 
(neoclassical) theories of income distribution illicit an ethics of fairness—“To each according to 
what he and the instruments he owns produces,” as Milton Friedman famously put it (Friedman 
1962). The effect of this theory is to justify as fair any conceivable distribution of income. 
The result is an innate bias towards the status quo, whatever it may be. 
A hierarchical power theory of income distribution is very different. If we parallel 
Friedman’s language, we might state that a hierarchical power theory elicits the following 
ethos: “To each according to his/her power to take.” Few would argue that this is fair—it is the 
basic recipe for despotism. But if individual income is most strongly determined by hierarchical 
power, then acts of income redistribution can be considered largely as checks on power—no 
different than the checks and balances that form the governmental basis of most liberal 
democracies. 
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